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Abstract 
The conditionality employed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its lending policy is one of the main 
themes of controversy in the debate on the new international financial architecture. The purpose of this paper is 
to propose an analytical framework integrating the diverse explanations of the failure of IMF conditionality. Our 
analysis is based on the idea that the IMF is a key player in the running of markets in a global economy. More 
precisely, we explain that most of the criticisms concerning conditionality should be analyzed through what we 
agree to call the institutional failures of IMF conditionality. These institutional failures must be appreciated at 
two complementary levels: the first level refers to the intrinsic bureaucratic bias of the IMF while the second 
deals with the inability of the IMF to manage the institutional change required for the development of market 
processes and hence to maintain the institutional order in recipient countries.  Although the first level failures 
have been particularly well studied via the international public choice approach, those of the second are, at best, 
often reduced to a simple statement. However, analyzing both levels of institutional failure of the IMF together is 
not without implications for the way in which the reforms of conditionality are conceived. Indeed, by including 
an analysis of the second level of failures, i.e. those relating to the relationship between conditionality and 
domestic institutional change, the recommendation of ex-ante conditionality emanating from the public choice 
approach, which tackles the first level of failures, will be invalidated. Instead a new approach will be proposed 
that suggests the separation of the role of the IMF as financial backer from its role as adviser to countries 
confronted by the globalization process.  
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The Institutional Failures of International Monetary Fund Conditionality 
1. Introduction 
Conditionality is a central feature of the IMF’s activities. Broadly defined, it is “a mechanism 
that links financing and policies” (IMF, 2001a: 4). Conditionality specifies policies, 
performance criteria and standards which borrowing countries must satisfy to receive 
resources from the Fund. 
Although conditionality was initially a vaguely expressed concept in the Bretton Woods 
Agreements, it developed during the 1950s with the expansion of IMF’s lending activities, 
and more particularly after 1979. During the 1980s and 1990s, the IMF was confronted by 
increasingly complex problems such as the debt crisis of developing countries, the transition 
of socialist countries to market economies, and the increased influence of global capital 
markets. Consequently, binding conditions attached to IMF agreements became ever more 
sophisticated and numerous. “The mean value of the average number of binding conditions 
for arrangements initiated between 1952 and 1973 was 4.23; between 1974 and 1982 was 
7.13; between 1983 and 1990 was 12.07 and between 1991 and 1995/2000 was 12.42” 
(Gould, 2001: 6)1. This trend has been accompanied by two developments. 
The first is that  the IMF has exerted a growing influence on domestic affairs. The increasing 
use of procedural conditionality, instead of target conditionality, is a clear illustration of this 
process. Targets refer to measures – such as a fiscal deficit limit – that can be met by 
borrowing countries in whatever way they choose. Procedures specify both ends and means 
by requiring countries to implement a single onetime action, for example a change in 
exchange rate regime or the adoption of new corporate governance principles. One 
consequence is that “procedures more directly dictate borrowing country policies, constrain 
domestic politicians and violate sovereignty” (Gould, 2001: 8)2.  The second development, as 
noted by Kapur and Webb (2000), is that the IMF has introduced more and more governance-
related conditionality in its programs. The point is that this new form of conditionality implies 
the need for institutional change in countries under IMF programs. It is a clear departure from 
the original purpose of conditionality. Indeed, conditionality was initially a tool to protect the 
financial integrity of the IMF, whose intent is to provide financial resources to member 
                                                 
1. See also, Goldstein (2000) and IMF (2001a) for statistical data. 
2. After 1982, a steady increase in procedural conditionality can be observed. 
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countries with balance of payments imbalances3. With the increasing number of conditions, 
the IMF has become more and more involved in micro-management whereas, initially, it was 
focused on its core areas, that is, monetary and fiscal macroeconomic issues. The link 
between IMF lending and balance of payments problems is increasingly less obvious. 
Although conditionality is now at the heart of the IMF’s activities, it is also one of the main 
areas of controversy in the debate on the new international financial architecture. Indeed, even 
if the IMF were successful in protecting its financial integrity (bearing in mind that this was 
one of the original purposes of conditionality), the poor completion of IMF programs, lead 
increasing numbers of observers to stress that conditionality is inefficient4. The main reasons 
for such inefficiency are as follows5. Firstly, the growing number of monitoring tools used by 
the IMF renders conditionality too complex and difficult to monitor. The IMF itself admits an 
“ambiguity about the boundaries of conditionality” (IMF, 2001a: 18). Secondly, the 
proliferation of conditions, especially structural conditions, makes conditionality too intrusive 
and costly. As a result, member countries are discouraged from demanding the Fund for 
assistance.  Not only do they contest the political legitimacy of the Bretton Woods institution, 
but also they wait for a situation to become extreme before resorting to IMF lending. Thirdly, 
conditionality seems ineffective in inducing policy changes. On the one hand, borrowers do 
not view the withholding of funds as a credible threat. On the other hand, the effectiveness of 
conditionality is undermined by difficulties in monitoring compliance. Finally, IMF 
conditionality suffers from the one-size-fits-all approach. The IMF staff uses best practices 
and theoretical benchmarks without investing sufficiently in obtaining knowledge of the 
initial conditions specific to each country, such as domestic political factors and the cultural 
environment. 
The purpose of this paper is to propose an analytical framework forging together these various 
explanations of the failure of IMF conditionality. Our analysis is based on the idea that the 
IMF as an institution plays a major role in running the market in the global economy. Indeed, 
                                                 
3. According to Article I of the Articles of Agreement, one of the purposes of the IMF is “to give confidence to 
members by making the general resources of the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, 
thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to 
measures destructive of national or international prosperity”. In other words, the original conception of IMF 
lending was to allow countries to make an adequate trade-off between adjustment and financing. 
4 Mussa and Savastano (2000), for example, studied 615 IMF arrangements over the 1973-1997 period using a 
sample composed of 5 industrial countries and 121 developing countries. Their main result was that more than a 
third of IMF programs ended with disbursements of less than half of the support initially agreed to. An extensive 
empirical literature confirms this poor completion of IMF programs. 
5. See Goldstein (2000) and Dreher (2006) for an overview. 
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let us recall that the function of any institution is to provide structures that enable players to 
coordinate their behaviour. Thus institutions provide an essential element for the harmonious 
functioning of markets. These coordination structures are provided by the IMF to countries 
engaged in IMF programs, especially through conditionality. Indeed using the mechanism of 
conditionality, the IMF is implicitly mandated by the international community to push 
countries that have IMF programs, to implement the institutional reforms and good practices 
required for participation in the process of market globalisation.  Consequently we explain 
that most of the criticisms addressed at conditionality should be analyzed through what we 
call the institutional failures of the IMF which, in turn, are a cause of the ineffectiveness of 
IMF conditionality. These institutional failures must be appreciated at two complementary 
levels: the first level refers to the intrinsic bureaucratic bias of the IMF while the second deals 
with the inability of the IMF to manage the institutional change required for the development 
of market processes and hence to maintain the institutional order in recipient countries.  
Although the first level failures have been particularly well studied via the international public 
choice approach, those of the second are, at best, often reduced to a simple statement. 
However, analyzing both levels of institutional failure of the IMF together is not without 
implications for the way in which the reforms of conditionality are conceived. Indeed, by 
including an analysis of the second level of failures, i.e. those relating to the relationship 
between conditionality and domestic institutional change, the recommendation of ex-ante 
conditionality emanating from the public choice approach, which tackles the first level of 
failures, will be invalidated. Instead a new approach will be proposed that suggests the 
separation of the role of the IMF as financial backer from its role as adviser to countries 
confronted by the globalization process. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyses the ineffectiveness of 
IMF conditionality from a public choice perspective. The purpose here is to return to the 
intrinsic institutional failures of the IMF so as to understand the poor completion of IMF 
programs. Section 3 makes use of the Austrian theory of institutions in order to appreciate the 
challenge of the institutional change faced by recipient countries. Section 4 concludes our 
discussion. 
2. The Ineffectiveness of Conditionality: a Public Choice Approach 
The institutional dimensions of IMF conditionality have been analyzed using the public 
choice approach. Indeed according to this line of analysis, the efficacy of IMF programs could 
be altered by focusing on factors which all refer to the institutional failures of the IMF. 
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Numerous studies devoted to examining the efficacy of IMF programs highlight, for example, 
the decisive role of political factors in undermining their success (2.1.). Two other 
institutional failures are also analyzed: the bureaucratic bias of the IMF on the one hand, and 
the weak incentives for implementation of conditions on the other (2.2.). The point is that 
these analyses all point to the need for a specific reform of conditionality based on the idea of 
pre-conditions (2.3.). 
2.1. The Influence of Political Factors on Conditionality 
Political factors and the efficacy of IMF programs are highly interactive: not only do domestic 
political factors exert an influence on the completion of IMF’s measures, but the IMF is not 
exempt from taking political factors into consideration when it decides to stop or continue an 
incomplete program at the end of the initial period of measures. 
When considering the interaction between international and domestic institutions to explain 
the completion of programs, Vreeland (2002) details the way in which governments may use 
the IMF’s leverage to push through unpopular policies. In a similar vein, Edwards (2001) 
demonstrates that the ability of governments to satisfy IMF conditionality depends on the 
political system; a fractionalized (divided?) legislative political organization will tend to 
exhibit poorer performance in fulfilling the aims of IMF programs than a united one. 
Ivanova et al. (2006) use an econometric approach to identify factors affecting 
implementation of IMF-supported programs. Program implementation is measured with 
different indicators referring to the extent to which the program has been completed without 
excessive delays, the extent to which conditions have been met, and the extent to which funds 
have been disbursed by the IMF. The variables that are likely to influence program 
implementation are as follows: (i) the political characteristics of borrowing countries, (ii) the 
variables describing the IMF’s behavior during program implementation, and (iii) domestic 
conditions in countries under programs and external conditions affecting them. The authors 
study 170 IMF programs over the period of 1992-1996. Their main result is that domestic 
political factors exert a strong influence on program implementation. Program completion is 
low in countries with strong special interests, lack of political cohesion, inefficient 
bureaucracies, and ethno-linguistic divisions6. Dreher (2003) stresses the influence of 
elections on the interruption of programs. Using a sample of 104 countries over the period of 
                                                 
6. Studying 77 developing countries between 1975 and 1999, Joyce (2003) shows that successful program 
implantation is affected by domestic political considerations, notably the degree of democracy, the degree of 
election competitiveness and the degree of political pluralism. 
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1975-1998, he shows that the frequency of interruption is higher before elections. This is 
especially the case in more democratic countries where governments need popular support to 
win elections. Interestingly, the author shows that elections and democracy interact with each 
other: the influence of elections on program interruptions decreases correspondingly with the 
degree of democracy. Assuming that non-compliance of conditions is higher before elections 
in such regimes, due to the unpopularity of the measures associated with IMF conditions, one 
can conclude that the Fund is probably more lenient towards democratic regimes. 
Dreher and Vaubel (2004a) suggest that IMF assistance facilitates political business cycles in 
the recipient countries7. According to the authors, IMF lending facilitates a pre-election 
boom8 while IMF conditionality is used by domestic authorities to justify post-election 
recession. According to their results, it appears that monetary expansion and fiscal deficits are 
larger at the time of elections, and that new net IMF credits are significantly larger 
immediately before and after elections in democratic countries.  
Does the strategy implemented by powerful states in the world economy explain the IMF’s 
decisions to interrupt or continue a program with a member state? The answer specified in the 
IMF’s charter is clear: political factors do not exert any influence. Empirical studies are more 
mixed in their conclusions. In order to explain why countries get financial assistance from the 
IMF, Barro and Lee (2005) suggest that the extent of political connections to the IMF appears 
to be a significant explanatory variable determining the probability and size of IMF loans9. 
Thacker (1999) studies the underlying causes of the IMF’s behavior concerning lending 
decisions and sanctions when borrower compliance with IMF conditionality is weak10. His 
main result is that politics matter in the IMF and consequently there is no guaranty that the 
deeper integration of the IMF into the domestic political game leads to better outcomes. The 
IMF, in its decision-making, does not necessarily follow the general interest of the countries 
concerned, but instead can be influenced by strategies pursued by powerful states in the world 
economy. According to Dreher and Jensen (2007), the United States exerts a significant 
                                                 
7 Based on a sample of 106 countries that obtained IMF credit over the period of 1971-1997. 
8. For example, governments can use IMF credits to make foreign exchange interventions in order to sustain the 
exchange rate regimes after a monetary expansion. 
9. The determinants of the political connections are the following: country quota, the number of nationals 
amongst the IMF staff, and member country’s political and economic proximity to the IMF’s major shareholding 
countries. Each of these determinants exerts a significant influence on IMF loans. 
10. Decisions to lend are analyzed over the period of 1985-1994 for 87 developing countries. 
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influence on IMF conditionality11. Not only do closer allies of the US enjoy a lower number 
of conditions than other countries, but also, prior to elections, it appears that IMF 
conditionality is softer with governments that support US international strategy. 
Overall, the influence of political factors on conditionality raises two issues that pose a 
challenge for the IMF. The first is that it appears to be increasingly necessary to devote 
sufficient resources “to identify reformers not to create them” (Dollar, Svensson, 2000: 896). 
The second is that the efficacy of IMF conditionality depends in part on the degree of 
depoliticization of IMF decisions. 
2.2. The IMF Institutional Failures 
Two institutional failures can be distinguished: those arising from the existence of a 
bureaucratic bias, in which the activities of the institution do not respond to collective needs 
but to the maximization of its budget; and those based on the weakness of incentive 
mechanisms within the IMF and between the IMF and the recipient countries.  
A potential bureaucratic bias can emerge from the ability of international institutions to 
become autonomous and to be powerful actors in global politics. Autonomy is based on 
knowledge of the functioning of the global economy and leads to an expertise, both technical 
and informational, that is not shared by international institutions with other actors, mainly 
states. An illustration of this process is the evolution of conditionality within the IMF. “The 
development of the principle of conditionality went hand-in-hand with a shift in responsibility 
from the executive board to the staff” (Martin, 2002: 20). 
With the evolution of conditionality, not only does the staff have a significant agenda-setting 
power, but it also acquires confidential information about the countries’ economic situation 
not transmitted to the executive directors. This evolution constitutes a powerful source of 
autonomy for the staff. Thus, the staff can use this autonomy to achieve its own preferred 
objective, that is the maximization of its budget and its size, by changing conditionality over 
time.  The evolution of conditionality is consequently not necessarily linked to changing 
conditions in the world economy. This hypothesis is confirmed by Dreher and Vaubel 
(2004b), who explain that the evolution of conditionality seems to be founded not on 
                                                 
11. 38 countries over the period of October 1997-March 2003 are studied. The relationship between the US and 
the recipient country is identified through voting in the United Nations generally assembly. The two countries 
are considered as allies when they vote in the same direction. 
 7
economic motives, but on the level of demand for IMF credit relative to the IMF quota12. 
Overall, the staff balances the marginal utility of imposing conditions, that is the safeguard of 
its financial integrity, with the marginal disutility of losing demand for its credit as a 
consequence of stronger conditions, that is a decrease in its influence. 
Two main incentive failures can be distinguished. The first refers to the decision-making 
process. At this level, Willett (2002) stresses the dependency of staff members, in terms of 
their careers, on the IMF management13 and Executive Board. Political pressures prevent  
staff members from advising on decisions exclusively founded on economic analysis: IMF 
lending to Russia is a good example, where political pressures from the major industrial 
countries led the staff to take decisions that were inefficient from an economic point of view.  
But bearing in mind management’s control over staff careers, it was rational to promote a loan 
to Russia. 
A second incentive failure within the IMF refers to what Svensson (2003) has called the 
“budget-pressure problem”. In most donor organizations, there is a discrepancy between 
allocation and disbursement decisions. Generally, allocation decisions are centralized, and 
depend on guidelines and procedures, while disbursement decisions are decentralized, and are 
based on specific projects or countries. Consequently organizations exhibit “a strong bias 
towards ‘always’ disbursing committed funds to the ex ante designated recipient, irrespective 
of the recipient government’s performance and the conditions in other potential aid recipient 
countries” (Svensson, 2003: 383). There is no link between the recipient country’s efforts to 
satisfy conditionality and the disbursement of funds14.  
2.3. The Reforms of Conditionality from a Public Choice Perspective: Tying the Hands of the 
IMF 
The public choice solution to these inefficiencies of conditionality is to tie ex ante the hands 
of the IMF. Thus, in the spirit of the Advisory Commission (Meltzer, 2000), Dreher and 
Vaubel (2004a and 2004b) suggest substituting ex post conditionality by ex ante 
                                                 
12. Their study uses two main statistical sources : a chronological study from 1958 to 1999; an econometric 
analysis over the period of October 1997-March 2003 for 206 IMF letters of intent concluded with 38 countries. 
“Conditionality increases when the demand for IMF credit grows relative to quota; (…) conditionality decreases 
or stagnates when the demand for IMF credit is weak or IMF quotas have been raised” (Dreher, Vaubel, 2004b: 
10). 
13. The Managing Director and Deputy Managing Directors. 
14. Svensson (2003) confirms this result using data from around 200 structural adjustment programs from the 
World Bank over the period of 1980-1995. 
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conditionality15. The main purpose of the latter is to establish the pre-conditions that country 
members must fulfill in order to be eligible for IMF lending. Pre-conditions reflect the 
financial soundness of countries, (Meltzer, 2000: 25) that is: (i) the country’s commitment to 
fiscal standards, (ii) a policy of transparency based on the public communication of timely 
and accurate financial information, (iii) an adequate capitalization of domestic banks, and (iv) 
authorization for foreign banks to participate in the domestic banking system. 
The IMF contingent credit lines (CCL) facility created in 1999 is close to this ex ante 
conditionality. The CCL facility offers member countries with strong economic policies, a 
precautionary line of defense against balance of payments problems linked to financial 
contagion. Countries satisfying pre-conditions could accede to a specified amount of 
financing automatically available. However since its creation, no country has signed up for 
pre-approval, and the Executive Board decided not to renew the CCL in November 200316. 
Although the IMF justifies such a decision by stressing the reinforcement of the international 
financial system, it seems that the CCL has suffered a major breakdown. Indeed, the CCL 
requires that each member country sign in advance a declaration regarding its potential need 
for IMF lending. The difficulty lies in the fact that the risk exists that such an official 
declaration may be interpreted as a negative signal by international markets. The reasoning is 
as follows: by subscribing to the CCL, a government implicitly announces that it anticipates a 
crisis and a need for IMF credit. This is why Dreher and Vaubel (2004b) defend the idea that 
all countries should be eligible for such a facility, without a pre-declaration if they respect the 
pre-conditions. This effective ex ante conditionality requires both an official mandate and a 
universal principle. 
The main advantage of the ex ante condition could be to reduce political pressures during 
currency crises and thus to enhance IMF credibility. However, for the promoters of this so-
called ex ante approach, conditionality should be limited only to short-term credits issued by 
the IMF during a liquidity crisis. 
The public choice approach to conditionality raises two questions (and has two drawbacks). 
First, in restricting ex ante conditionality to short term credits, is omits the question of 
structural conditionality. Despite intense debates about the opportunity to transfer this 
                                                 
15. Vaubel (1991) has made a similar suggestion. 
16. IMF Press Release, no. 03/207, November 26, 2003. 
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conditionality to development agencies (such as the World Bank)17, structural conditions 
remain very important in the programs of the IMF. At present structural conditionality exerts 
a strong influence on institutional changes in countries under IMF supported-programs. 
Second, and more importantly, as we will explain below, both ex post and ex ante 
conditionality have to deal with the domestic institutional changes accompanying lending to 
recipient countries. Public choice theory proposes only a partial study of the institutional 
dimension of IMF conditionality. Indeed, as conditionality inefficiencies are limited to the 
running of the IMF itself and to the evaluation of the incentives schemes, the public choice 
view shares the same inconsistency with the IMF when considering the institutional 
component of conditionality. 
We believe that taking into account these institutional changes is a necessary condition for 
understanding the circumstances required for improved intervention on the part of the IMF. 
Contrary to what the Advisory Commission has said, such analysis will not lead us to a 
rejection of any kind of long-term structural conditionality on the part of the IMF18. On the 
contrary, this type of conditionality is useful in promoting structural reforms in developing 
countries in order to enable them to adapt their economies to the globalization process. The 
problem for the IMF then is not only one of  modifying the incentive mechanisms, but also of 
considering what reforms might be suitable given the subsequent process of domestic 
institutional change foreseen. From this perspective, structural conditionality does not 
necessarily need to be tied to lending. The following section is dedicated to this issue.  
3. Towards an Austrian Theory of IMF Conditionality Failures 
In any explanation of economic development as well as of the difference in performance of 
economies over time, the importance played by institutional change is scarcely controversial. 
(Rodrik, 2005) (North, Weingstat 1989). More precisely even if growth without good 
institutions might be possible, sustainable growth requires major institutional change along 
with the implementation of institutional functions the objectives of which are to create, 
regulate, stabilize and thus legitimize markets (Rodrik, 2005).  Having established this point, 
however, it begs the question as to how such a goal can be reached especially in low-income 
countries. The question has aspects sides to it. The first refers to the financial capacity of 
countries to invest in their institutional architecture. The second refers to the implementation 
                                                 
17. As suggested, among others, by the Advisory Commission. 
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process itself. Here, IMF conditionality is required to play a major role. This section thus 
returns to the issue of the structural conditions attached to IMF programs. Drawing on the 
Austrian perspective concerning the critical role of institutions in the market process, we 
explain why conditionality may jeopardize the institutional order of recipient countries (3.1).  
This analysis leads us to criticize traditional proposals for the reform of conditionality (3.2). 
Alternative proposals are made for improving conditionality. The cornerstone of these 
proposals consists of redesigning the relationship between the recipient countries confronted 
by the need for major institutional changes, and the IMF. Such an evolution implies a 
transformation of the role of the IMF. (3.3). 
3.1. Institutions, Institutional Changes and Conditionality 
Let us recall that an institution is usually defined as “a regularity in social behavior that is 
agreed to by all members of society, specifies behavior in specific recurrent situations and is 
either self-policed or policed by some external authority” (Schotter, 1981: 11). This definition 
requires consideration not only of the legal framework, but also of regular behavioral 
practices associated with a set of rules, norms and routines. These two elements may 
influence both the emergence and evolution of institutions.  
Institutions also represent a means by which agents, who are ignorant of each other's actions 
and expectations, obtain information that enables them to co-ordinate with each other. In other 
words, they represent nothing more and nothing less than a necessary condition for the 
running and development of markets (O'Driscoll, Rizzo, 1996)19. 
Modifying the institutional structure of any economy is consequently not only complex but 
likely to induce some profound and not necessarily foreseen or appropriate economic changes. 
This is the case when implementing conditionality. Structural conditionality imposes domestic 
institutional changes. This is so even though the IMF has tried to reduce the number of 
structural conditions in its new programs. The structural benchmarks (SBMs) that focus on 
qualitative indicators, going beyond the traditional quantitative indicators of the IMF, have 
                                                                                                                                                        
18. Adopting a different perspective, Willett (2003) suggests separating IMF programs into two major categories: 
a short-term facility with ex ante conditionality, and  structural conditionality. 
19. This argument naturally rests on the idea that the knowledge disseminated by institutions is of a stabilizing 
nature, in that it reaffirms the stability of the social structure at regular intervals, unlike that disseminated by the 
price system, which is of a dynamic nature in that it leads individuals to revise their plans continually (Hayek, 
1945). 
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followed the same development (IMF, 2001a)20. More fundamentally, it is increasingly 
obvious that every IMF action, the main intent of which is to obtain macroeconomic 
equilibrium, is never without consequences with respect to the institutional structure of a 
recipient country, even if the IMF tries to concentrate the majority of structural conditions on 
a relatively small number of sectors21.  
The analysis of structural conditionality thus requires that we specify the conditions required 
for the recipient country’s institutional order to have coherence. More precisely, such analysis 
must enable us to solve three interrelated problems. 
Firstly, we formulate the issue of the institutional order and its unity.  If the complementarity 
of institutions is what builds the institutional order of a society, the purpose then is to identify 
the forces that encourage integration, as well as the circumstances under which these forces 
cease to work. The distinction between ‘designed institutions’ and ‘undesigned institutions’ 
(Lachmann, 1970) is crucial here. The former, which include legal norms, are “the products of 
legislation and other manifestations of the ‘social will’” (Lachmann, 1970: 69), while the 
latter are spontaneous entities, understood as “recurrent patterns of conduct” (ibid.: p.75). 
According to Lachmann’s logic, while not all institutions assume the same status and 
function, they do, nevertheless, share the attribute of flexibility linked to the permanency of 
the whole. The matter now arising is how to make institutional change and structural 
permanence compatible, as it is not so much the change per se which gives rise to problems 
here, but rather unexpected change22. Conditionality should not be implemented without 
                                                 
20 “SBMs are indicators which aim to delineate the expected path of reform for individual structural policy 
measures and that can facilitate the evaluation of progress for these actions. Because many structural policies 
cannot be expressed in quantitative form, structural benchmarks are usually expressed qualitatively; for example, 
if the program calls for privatization of the state-owned telephone company, submitting the privatization bill to 
the legislature by date x could be one structural benchmark. Failure to meet structural benchmarks conveys a 
negative signal but does not automatically render a country ineligible to draw; instead, a decision about 
eligibility would be judgmental and would likely be made in a broader mid-year program review -itself an 
instrument of conditionality- with an eye toward the country’s overall progress on the structural front” (IMF, 
2000c). 
21 “The majority of structural conditions –between a half and two thirds– have been, and continue to be, 
concentrated in a relatively small number of sectors that are at the very core of the Fund’s involvement in 
member countries: exchange and trade systems, and fiscal and financial sectors. The relative importance of these 
sectors has changed, with reforms in the exchange and trade system now playing a smaller role and the financial 
sector a more important one than in the early 1990s. In addition, public enterprise restructuring and privatization 
-in part motivated by fiscal considerations- have accounted for about one fifth of the structural conditions in 
Fund-supported programs. Nevertheless, while a large part of structural conditionality has focused on a relatively 
small number of sectors that are closely linked to stabilization and external adjustment, this does not guarantee 
that structural reforms have always been adequately prioritized nor does it imply that too broad a reform agenda 
has never been an issue” (IMF, 2001a). 
22. Only this latter type of change is likely to disrupt some plans in the course of action. 
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taking into account its effects on institutional complementarity, that is on the institutional 
order of the affected country. 
Secondly, the distinction between induced and imposed institutional change (Lin, 1989) must 
be considered. An induced institutional change refers to the modification or replacement of an 
existing institution or the emergence of a new one that is voluntarily initiated and executed by 
an individual or a group of individuals in response to profitable opportunities. An imposed 
change, in contrast, is introduced and executed by an authority following its own rationale. 
The main point here is that institutional changes accompanying the IMF’s programs are often 
imposed and rarely induced. The consequence is that conditionality may be conducive to a 
deterioration of agents’ economic performances compared with the initial situation.  
Thirdly, we must not forget that institutional change takes time. Indeed, the transformation of 
existing institutions, as in the creation of new institutions, is subject to delays: delays of 
implementation in the first instance, and delays of construction in the second. Yet the amount 
of economic change possible per unit of time is always limited because agents have limited 
training capacities. Indeed, given a theoretical or practical scenario, in which an economic or 
political authority –in this case the IMF– decides to put into place new institutions, via 
conditional Fund-supported programs, the benefits expected from this type of measure are 
debatable. The reason is that, insofar as such a policy is, by definition, limited to designed 
institutions, its success depends on the capacity of these new elements to meet the demand for 
change in institutions not yet designed. The difficulty lies in the fact that, although the 
transformation of designed institutions is, in general, both radical and speedy, that of non-
designed institutions is of an incremental nature and is necessarily subject to path-dependent 
constraints. “Various institutions and social expectations change at different speeds, 
particularly when there is a mix of exogenous and endogenous forces, as when global markets 
interact with domestic policies [...].The central problem to be addressed […] is variable 
institutional adaptation” (Jacobs, 1999: 8). Yet in all cases, the time horizon of any structural 
program, that is the time horizon of conditionality, is radically different from that necessary 
for implementing the required institutional change. 
Solving these three issues comes down to providing a solution to the so-called permanency-
flexibility dilemma that any emerging and low-income economy faces. The issue is thus how 
to make institutional change and structural permanence compatible. Even if not all institutions 
assume the same status and function, they all share the attribute of flexibility linked to the 
permanency of a whole. The permanence of the overall institutional order does not involve the 
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permanency of each part. But how can the need for coherence and permanence be reconciled 
with the need for flexibility, especially for low-income countries? The potential solutions are 
of primary importance in indicating what the role played by the IMF should be, more 
precisely in pointing to a transformation of its role beyond that of imposing so-called ex ante 
conditionality.  
3.2. Reform of Conditionality : A Critical Review of Traditional Solutions 
Proposals relating to the reform of conditionality focus on the necessity of strengthening the 
ownership of programs. This is a result of the strong correlation between successful 
completion of measures and the degree of ownership23. Ownership is a multidimensional 
concept (World Bank, 1992). First, it refers to the extent to which planned reforms in 
programs have been locally or externally initiated. Second, it is based on the idea that 
intellectual conviction as to the appropriateness of measures, matters. Finally, the degree of 
support from top political leadership appears to be a determinant of ownership24. Two 
complementary approaches to conditionality reform aim to strengthen ownership. 
The first approach establishes that the efficacy of conditionality could be improved by means 
of a more flexible approach25. Some critical of IMF-programs consider that the penalties 
attached to the current conditionality are unsatisfactory. In principle, a program that has failed 
to be completed is penalized based on what the initial overall measures agreed to have been. 
Thus, implicitly, the relationship between the IMF and the recipient countries follows a “take-
it-or-leave-it” logic. Such a penalty scheme lacks flexibility if one considers the obligation 
that a country comes under to implement both macroeconomic adjustments and structural 
reforms. In effect, waivers introduce a degree of flexibility into IMF-programs. Under this 
scheme, the IMF agrees not to interrupt a program, even in cases of non-observance of 
performance criteria, if it considers that the program will eventually be successfully 
implemented. Under these circumstances, IMF-supported programs could be considered 
dynamic and flexible.  But, as stressed by the IEO (2005b), flexibility linked to waivers is not 
necessarily a satisfactory situation, but rather reflects  “unrealistic expectations” (IEO, 2005b: 
                                                 
23. Numerous empirical studies have established this relationship. See Collier et al. (1998). 
24. IMF defines ownership as follows: “ownership is a willing assumption of responsibility for an agreed 
program of policies, by officials in a borrowing country who have the responsibility of formulating and carrying 
out those policies, based on an understanding that the program is achievable and is in the country’s own interest” 
(IMF, 2001b: 6). 
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10). A more genuinely flexible procedure could be one based on a disaggregated reform 
package and a floating tranche.  In this vein, Leandro et al. (1999), and in a similar approach 
Collier et al. (1997), propose to divide reform packages into several reform areas, each of 
them being the object of specific conditionality and monitoring. The aim is to be able to 
devise a penalty that is more proportional to the initial lapse in implementation. The floating 
tranche approach, supported by Khan and Sharma (2006), would allow each country to 
implement structural reforms at their own speed without putting the receipt of funds into 
question if a section of  reforms has or has not been completed. The proposal is that the IMF 
would disburse credits (called floating tranches) in proportion to the adoption of structural 
reforms specified in the initial agreement. But only the usual quantitative performance criteria 
would be the object of conditionality. 
Furthermore, the development of a flexible approach implies that the IMF would need to be 
engaged in intensive and informal policy dialogue with the recipient country. The views of 
government, political leaders, trade unions and members of civil society would all need to be 
taken into account. As explained by Collier et al. (1998), the IMF has to develop “a more 
systematic mechanism for providing ex post support for country-initiated, or home-grown, 
programs” (p.22). Three implications are inferred from this new strategy. First, resident 
missions in recipient countries could have more authority. Second, the IMF should allocate 
more resources and time in order to improve their understanding of countries’ political 
constraints. Finally, a greater degree of initiative could be given to domestic authorities during 
the negotiation of the program in order to give the process more credibility, implying the need 
for more flexible behavior on the part of IMF staff26. 
A second approach, adopted by the IMF, is to streamline structural conditionality. Taking into 
account the poor performance of its recent programs, the IMF is trying to reduce the number 
                                                                                                                                                        
25. A detailed presentation of this approach is beyond the scope of this paper. See, among others: Leandro, 
Schafer and Frontini (1999); Collier et al. (1997); Collier, Gunning and Hamada (1998); Khan and Sharma 
(2006). 
26. In 1999, the IMF and the World Bank initiated the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers which give a greater 
degree of initiative to governments in low-income countries. Indeed, PRSPs are prepared by governments 
according to a participatory process involving domestic stakeholders. A PRSP describes the macroeconomic, 
structural and social policies and programs adopted by a country for several years (IMF 2003a). In August 2006, 
78 countries were eligible for the poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. The last IMF available review 
(September 2005) shows that 49 full PRSPs have been circulated to the Fund Executive Board and an additional 
11 countries have completed “interim” PRSPs. Although it is too early to evaluate them, preliminary assessments 
have stressed the participatory gap after the adoption of the programs and the conflicts between their multiple 
objectives, revealing the difficulty in adopting a clear priority order. For an external evaluation of PRSP, see 
Killick (2002) and I.E.O (2005a); for an internal evaluation, IMF (2003b). 
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of structural conditions reform in order to concentrate its attention on structural reforms that 
are “critical” to the achievement of macroeconomic targets. The new conditionality guidelines 
follow three principles. First, IMF conditionality has to cover structural conditions which are 
“critical” to the success of the program’s macroeconomic objectives. Second, structural 
reforms, which are not critical but “relevant” to the program’s macroeconomic objectives, and 
which, at the same time, fall within the IMF’s core areas, can possibly be subject to 
conditionality. Finally, conditionality would not apply to structural reforms which are not 
critical and fall outside the core areas of the IMF’s responsibilities, even if they were macro-
relevant. Here, the main difficulty is to define the threshold of what is considered critical. 
According to the IMF, “critical importance means that excluding the condition would 
seriously threaten the achievement of the program’s goals or the Fund’s ability to monitor 
implementation […]. Determining which measures are critical is inherently an element of 
judgment” (IMF, 2003a). In the IMF review of the 2002 Conditionality guidelines (IMF, 
2005a), two main trends are revealed.  On the one hand, the share of structural conditions in 
non-core areas fell by 17-18 percentage points in both GRA-supported programs and PRGF-
supported programs. On the other hand, while PRGF-programs exhibit a significant decline of 
the average number of structural conditions (from 17-18 to 13-14 percentage points in the late 
1990s), in GRA-programs this average number instead increased in recent years. These results 
indicate “substantial differences between the aspirations of the Fund’s management and the 
actual changes so far achieved” (Killick, 2002: 2). They reflect also the ambiguity and 
imprecision of the IMF targets due to divisions inside the Executive Board as to how far the 
reduction in structural conditionality should go. The staff has taken advantage of these 
divisions to resist the streamlining of the conditionality process (I.E.O., 2005b). 
Even if all the previous approaches might represent progress in improving IMF conditionality, 
they are not necessarily an appropriate response to the problem of institutional change implied 
by structural conditionality. The main challenge consists in responding to new concerns 
encountered as a result of the globalization of markets, mainly through ensuring compatibility 
between domestic and global goals. Indeed, globalization goes hand in hand with the 
standardization of market processes. And, as we have explained, the IMF becomes a key 
player in such a process with its new function of facilitating the development of markets in 
developing countries in accordance with both global standards and domestic constraints.  
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3.3. A new Form of  Conditionality 
The difficulty consists in the IMF developing its actions around two complementary temporal 
horizons. The first, encompassing crisis management as well as prevention, requires short-
term actions using traditional tools such as emergency lending and macroeconomic 
conditionality. Here one finds the IMF in its traditional role, i.e. that of financial backer, and 
hence with this, the traditional concept of conditionality. The second refers rather to a 
medium and long-term horizon implying action oriented towards development issues, such as 
the development of market processes. This second horizon requires the IMF to develop its 
mandate as adviser to countries confronted by the globalization process. Here, institutional 
factors play a crucial role. The point we are making, however, is that, when not explicitly 
taken into account, these two functions may contradict one another. The confusion arising 
between the requirements of these two horizons is especially relevant in two situations: when 
member countries are confronted by financial crises on the one hand; and when institutional 
weaknesses are significant in countries under IMF-programs on the other hand. 
The Asian crisis is a striking example of the first situation. In 1997, the IMF concluded 
unprecedented emergency lending agreements with Thailand (August, $ 17 billion), Indonesia 
(November, $ 35 billion) and Korea (December, $ 57 billion). These agreements had a similar 
basic design. This consisted of a mix of traditional conditionality, based on loans to the 
central bank and government for the repayment of debts and the stabilization of exchange 
rates, and on a macroeconomic framework promoting restrictive fiscal and monetary policies. 
At the same time it included structural conditionality focusing on a restructuring of the 
financial sector and on good governance measures (transparency, dismantling of monopolies, 
elimination of directed lending, growing role of financial markets). According to the IMF, this 
strategy was appropriate in order to re-establish confidence in the financial markets27. Indeed, 
the Fund considered that the vulnerabilities of the financial and corporate sectors were 
attributable to governance and market discipline deficiencies. In fact, the main purpose of the 
strategy was to transfer governance principles long adopted in Western advanced economies. 
However, these programs were not only ineffective in preventing exchange rate depreciations, 
but they also exacerbated instability (Radelet, Sachs, 1998). In a crisis situation, and 
subsequently within a very short-term horizon, structural conditions imposed by the IMF, 
                                                 
27. For instance, see Lane et al. (1999); Baliño et al. (2000). 
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particularly after the Asian crisis, were aimed at profoundly modifying the domestic 
institutions of economies thereby provoking economic destabilization.  
Countries where rule of law and institutional quality are the weakest often belong to the 
category of low-income countries28. The IMF (2004) recognizes four areas of work with low-
income member countries: (i) policy advice; (ii) capacity building; (iiii) financing and debt 
relief; and (iv) implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (through the Monterrey 
Consensus). Capacity building is especially important for our purposes. The IMF uses 
different tools in order to strengthen the institutional architecture in low-income member 
countries (Hakura, Nsouli, 2003). The report of the observance of standards and codes 
(ROSCs) allows the IMF to promote the adoption of standards in 11 areas grouped into three 
categories: (i) transparency standards; (ii) financial sector standards; and (iii) market integrity 
standards for the corporate sector. IMF staff members work with domestic authorities to 
identify financial sector vulnerabilities and to provide technical assistance through the 
financial sector assessment program (FSAP). 
Whatever the situation –financial crisis or institutional weakness- the IMF structural 
conditionality suffers from the same drawback: the “one-size-fits-all” approach consisting of 
transplanting the institutional architecture of mature countries to emerging and developing 
countries. This approach contradicts recent lessons suggested by the literature on the impact 
of reforms on growth29. Rodrik (2005) stresses that “principles such as appropriate incentives, 
property rights, sound money, and fiscal solvency all come institution free […]. There may be 
multiple ways of packing these principles into institutional arrangements”. For example, 
China has experimented with a heterodox way of achieving the above principles, while Latin 
American countries have adopted the Washington Consensus principles based on an orthodox 
concept. In terms of growth performances, the two groups of countries have experienced 
contrasting outcomes: a strong performance for China, but poor for Latin American countries. 
In an empirical study, Berkowitz et al. (2003) show the inefficiencies engendered by the 
transplantation of formal legal frameworks originating in Western countries to other 
countries. The I.E.O. (2005c) stresses that the effectiveness of the technical assistance 
provided by the IMF “has been undermined by a lack of awareness of institutional, 
organizational, or managerial features of the recipient country” (p.11). Financial reforms in 
                                                 
28. For an overview of the relationship between low-income countries and IMF, see for instance Lombardi 
(2005); Martin and Bargawi (2005). 
29. See the recent World Bank study (World Bank, 2005) and Rodrik (2006). 
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emerging markets underestimated the weight of asymmetric information in such economies. 
In this context, banks play a major role to favor the development of contractual practices 
(Allegret, Dulbecco, Courbis, 2003). When the international financial institutions promote 
financial liberalization, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that such measures alone 
cannot lead to new financial systems in which market mechanisms are expected to play an 
important role. The implementation of new legal regulations by authorities does not 
necessarily lead to the acquiescence of institutions. Indeed, they must be adopted by private 
agents. In other words, promoting banking reforms, in which the main objective is to 
encourage banking practices in emerging economies that will converge with practices adopted 
in numerous mature markets, is not necessarily the most efficient way to promote economic 
growth. Interpersonal relationships are less prominent in developed countries because of the 
presence of liquid financial markets with strong legal rules and contract-enforcement 
mechanisms. Overall, empirical findings confirm our analytical framework: institutional 
reforms are part of a long-term process that must take into account specific domestic 
circumstances. Successful reforms must be country-specific and not based on a global and 
uniform concept of the working of the market economy. 
What are the implications for the conduct of IMF structural conditionality? The IMF has to 
resolve two difficulties in its interventions in developing countries. The first is the time 
horizon of its policies. On the one hand, structural conditionality requires a long-term 
perspective with delays in reform implementation and path dependency constraints. On the 
other hand, IMF lending is by nature short term, focused mainly on 3 year programs. These 
timings are not compatible with each other. Second, the confusion between its two functions –
policy adviser, especially on matters of institutional reforms, and financial backer- is subject 
to conflicts of interest, which undermine IMF efficacy. In order to strengthen the effectiveness 
of the IMF, it seems to us necessary to disentangle these two functions and allow IMF-
supported programs including structural conditionality to have longer time horizons. From 
this perspective, a reform of conditionality should proceed along two main steps. The first is a 
general application of the policy support instrument (PSI). This new instrument allows 
member countries to benefit from IMF staff advice without Fund financial assistance. The 
main purpose of the PSI is “to help low-income countries members in designing and pursuing 
policies that meet high standards, and to signal the strength of these policies” (IMF, 2005h: 
5). Policy dialogue between the Fund and member countries is more intense and frequent 
under this arrangement than with the Article IV consultations framework. The PSI is based on 
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the member’s poverty reduction strategy and includes areas such as financial sector reform, 
transparency, and strengthening institutions. At present, PSIs are exclusively dedicated to 
“mature stabilizers”, i.e. to countries who don’t need IMF assistance30. Furthermore, the 
duration of these programs remains too short31 with regard to the objectives of institutional 
reform that they contain. It seems to us that the Policy Support Instrument should be 
generalized to all developing countries involved in IMF-programs in which institutional 
reform is implied.  A second step in the reform of IMF conditionality is to endow the IMF 
with tools that would allow it to take better account of the specific domestic circumstances of 
every member country. In 2004, the IMF created a new instrument for low-income countries 
that emphasizes the distributional impact of major macroeconomic and structural reforms: the 
Policy and Social Impact Analysis. We propose to create a similar instrument focusing on the 
institutional impact of IMF-programs. 
4 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have stressed the failures of IMF conditionality, focusing on structural 
conditionality. The IMF must build a new approach to structural conditionality in order to 
safeguard the coherence of the institutional order in recipient countries. Conditionality implies 
institutional change and institutional change is a very complex process which cannot be 
managed through so-called ex ante conditionality. An alternative solution should not consist 
of rejecting such change but rather, dealing with its complexity and diversity head on. The 
analytical framework proposed should help to evaluate both the institutional component of 
conditionality and the necessary evolution of the role of the IMF. Indeed we suggest a 
separation of the role of the IMF as financial backer from its role as adviser to countries 
confronted by the globalization process32. From our perspective, the role of the Fund could be 
(taken over by?? Presumably there is no one to take over the lending role of the IMF but 
external advisers or consultants could take over the advisory role that IMF staff currently 
play?) that of an external adviser or consultant in order to take into account the specific 
circumstances of each country in a global context. By global context, we refer to the new 
constraints implied by the globalization process that tend to impose a standardized set of 
behaviors. The evolution of conditionality proposed in this paper would imply that each 
                                                 
30. Nigeria has been the first IMF-member to use PSI in October 2005. 
31. The duration is between one year and three years with a maximum of four years. 
32. Bevan (2005) voices several doubts regarding the traditional link between policy advice and financing. Such a 
separation could apply to the World Bank too. On World Bank conditionality, see Dreher (2004). 
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country benefiting from the advice of the IMF should find the best trade-off between the 
specific characteristics of the domestic institutional order and the global market. This is for us 
the main challenge of globalization: that is to build coherence between global governance and 
domestic objectives. 
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